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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have the 
potential of being employed in a variety of applications ranging 
from battlefield surveillance to everyday applications such as 
smart homes and patient monitoring. Security is a major 
challenge that all applications based on WSNs are facing 
nowadays. Firstly, due to the wireless nature of WSNs, and 
secondly due to their ability to operate in unattended 
environments makes them even more vulnerable to various 
sorts of attacks. Among these attacks is node capture attack in 
WSNs, whose threat severity can range from a single node 
being compromised in the network to the whole network being 
compromised as a result of that single node compromise. In 
this paper, we propose the use of ICMetric technology to 
provide resilience against node compromise in WSN. ICmetrics 
generates the security attributes of the sensor node based on 
measurable hardware and software characteristics of the 
integrated circuit. These properties of ICmetrics can help 
safeguard WSNs from various node capture attacks. 
Keywords-node capture attacks; ICMetrics; Wireless Sensor 
Networks; security 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of typically 
tiny nodes that are able to wirelessly communicate between 
themselves, and hence maintain communication without the 
need for human intervention [1]. These tiny low-cost 
wireless devices make wireless sensor networking a viable 
solution for a range of applications in WSNs [2]. However 
the wireless nature of WSNs also makes them susceptible to 
a range of passive and active attacks [3]; such as 
eavesdropping, routing attacks, node replication attacks, 
Denial of Service attacks and last but not the least the node 
capture attack, which has always been a major research 
challenge for researchers.  
In a wireless sensor network, an attacker can 
compromise and gain access to the network as a legitimate 
user by capturing a sensor node in the network. This can 
generally mean extracting various attributes associated with 
the sensor node such as the cryptographic keys or even 
changing the hardware or software configurations associated 
with the sensor node.  
Unless there is physical security [4] provided at the 
sensor node, they are vulnerable to node compromise attack, 
which can lead to the entire network being overtaken by 
attackers without even coming to know about adversarial 
presence in the wireless sensor network. But this is not a 
very practical solution, since making the sensor nodes 
tamper resistant results in an increase in the overall cost of 
the network. Therefore there is need to propose algorithmic 
solutions to the problem of node compromise in WSNs.  
Cryptographic algorithms that are used to provide secure 
communication in WSNs depend on the use of stored 
encryption/decryption keys [5]. These algorithms have the 
inherent disadvantage that if a sensor node is compromised, 
it will lead to key/ secret information being revealed to the 
adversaries, which can ultimately result in even the entire 
network being overtaken and important data being revealed. 
We propose the use of Integrated Circuit metrics or 
ICmetrics [6] as an alternative to stored 
encryption/decryption keys, for providing resilience against 
node capture attacks in WSNs. ICmetrics uses unique 
measurable properties and features of a hardware device to 
generate a basis number, which in turn can be used to 
generate the key. ICmetrics is very similar to biometrics 
where human properties and features are used to uniquely 
identify a person. The use of ICmetrics in WSNs removes 
the need for key storage; since the key is generated as and 
when needed based on the hardware/software characteristics 
of the sensor node. This feature safeguards WSNs from a 
node capture attack taking place on the network. 
Furthermore since the keys are generated every time, based 
on the designated hardware/software properties of the sensor 
node, any change to the hardware/ software configuration of 
the sensor node also never goes undetected. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; in 
section 2 we discuss the attacks inherent to WSNs since they 
are fundamentally different from traditional networks. In 
particular the node capture attack in wireless sensor network 
is discussed in section 3 which is the focus of this paper. To 
completely understand the possibility of a node capture 
attack taking place in any way, section 4 talks about its 
actual decomposition on passive attacks, active attacks and 
then a physical node capture taking place. Section 5 
discusses the ICmetrics technology and its features. Section 
6 elaborates on how ICmetrics is useful in safeguarding 
against node capture attacks in WSNs. To fully understand 
the threat model, section 7 outlines how ICmetrics will 
safeguard against node capture attacks by taking two 
different scenarios of possible node capture attacks. The final 
section concludes our paper. 
II. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK ATTACKS 
Protecting sensor nodes in a wireless sensor network 
from attacks has been a major area of research since the 
advent of WSNs [7]. When we talk about security of 
hardware devices in general it is typical to think that 
protecting those devices means to protect them from 
unauthorized access and malicious software such as viruses; 
while physical security of the device is taken for granted.  
However, the context in case of WSNs is much more 
complicated, particularly due to the broadcast nature of the 
wireless medium, which makes the network even more 
vulnerable to attacks; such as spoofing, altering and 
replaying of routing information, selective forwarding, 
sinkhole attacks, sybil attacks and wormhole attacks. Fig. 1 
depicts a typical scenario of an attack that could possibly 
take place due to the wireless/ broadcast nature of WSNs. A 
wireless sensor network is composed of aggregator sensor 
nodes that gather and aggregate data from sensor nodes for 
selective forwarding, whereas sensor nodes typically sense 
their environment and forward data to aggregator nodes [8]. 
In WSNs due to the broadcast nature of the wireless 
medium, the data is broadcast to all the sensor nodes that lie 
within the range of any originating node, whether it is an 
aggregator node or simply a sensor node. Now as evident 
from Fig. 1, there is adversarial presence in the form of an 
intruder node in the network. Due to broadcast nature of 
communication taking place within the network, the intruder 
node will also receive the broadcasted data packets from all 
originating nodes if it lies in their communication range. 
This enables the intruder to gather information about the 
network to launch future attacks. 
 
 
Figure 1. Wireless Sensor Network 
 
Secondly their placement in hostile and unattended 
environments opens them to a range of attacks [9], which 
are particularly subject to their nature of not being 
physically protected as such. Since sensor nodes are 
accessible to the attackers, physical access control is not just 
as simple as denying access to the sensor node but there are 
much bigger issues there that need resolving. 
Sensor nodes in WSNs are particularly vulnerable to 
attacks that aim to infect/ change hardware configuration and 
software characteristics of the data resident in the program 
memory. These types of attacks are usually referred to node 
capture attacks. Due to their severity of impact on the 
network, node capture attacks are one of the most pressing 
challenges in WSNs and to provide resilience against node 
capture attacks is a major issue [10]. 
III. NODE CAPTURE ATTACKS 
Node capture attacks [11] enable attackers to capture the 
nodes in a WSN with having to do a lot of effort to launch 
the attack. The effect of node capture attack, as stated above 
can be to extract the cryptographic keys or manipulate the 
hardware/ software characteristics of the sensor node. 
Therefore, even if a single node is compromised, this can 
overtake the entire network. If node capture attacks are left 
undetected, they can have disastrous effects on the security 
of the network, since the whole network might have been 
overtaken without knowing it. This in effect may have an 
even bigger impact since it can lead to a larger class of 
attacks being launched on multiple networks. These attacks 
can result in complete loss of security within the network or 
even multiple communicating networks. 
IV. THREAT MODEL 
Node capture attacks are actually a hybrid of passive, 
active and physical attacks; these all work together for the 
actual node capture attack to take place. The aim of an 
adversary in a wireless sensor network is to gather as much 
information as possible about the network operation through 
passive and active participation, so as to successfully launch 
a node capture attack. From the attacker’s perspective, the 
notion of a successful node capture attack is to gather as 
much information as possible about the network and then 
physically capture the node/s that lie at the heart of the 
whole network’s operations and that can provide the 
attacker the maximum information to launch further attacks 
on maybe other networks. 
WSNs work over wireless communication links so the 
nature of communication can easily aid the adversary in 
eavesdropping on the communication link. This also 
provides a chance for the adversary to silently capture 
important network information, either localized to a single 
node or all around the network.  
If the data packets communicated throughout the 
network are encrypted, the adversary can extract important 
information from the packet headers which in turn can tell 
the attacker about the network structure, protocols being 
used and the network states. Once the attacker has gathered 
sufficient amount of information about the network, the 
attacker can start to actively participate in the network by 
querying various nodes in different ways to gather as much 
information as possible or even sending malicious packets. 
V. ICMETRICS-INTEGRATED CIRCUIT METRICS 
ICmetrics or Integrated Circuit metrics makes use of 
system level characteristics to provide identification to the 
system [12]. It generates keys based on the hardware/ 
software characteristics and specification of the node. 
ICmetrics compute the required metrics on those hardware 
and software characteristics that are difficult for the attacker 
to deduce. These metrics/ features are not static but infact 
vary in a pre-determined fashion. For example, the address 
and value from the data transactions of a processor; its 
program address; and metrics for the effectiveness of the 
program and data caches derived from performance 
counters, etc [12].  
After each key generation stage the produced encryption 
key is temporary and exists only locally, and the 
reproduction of the key once again takes place from 
measurable characteristics of the integrated circuit [14]. 
ICmetrics is not dependent on any particular encryption 
algorithm and there are no secret keys to share between the 
sender and receiver. ICmetrics generates an encryption key 
directly from measurable properties of a given hardware 
device, similar to the way biometrics extracts human 
features to perform an operation. 
Analogous to biometrics, the features extracted from 
integrated circuits might not be stable, in that case the 
feature values may be based on values taken from a 
Gaussian distribution [13]. 
A. Safeguarding against Node Capture Attacks using 
ICMetrics 
Traditionally to enable secure communication in a 
Wireless Sensor Network, encryption/ decryption has 
always been based on the use of stored keys for functioning 
of the network. However the use of stored keys to enable 
secure communication is threatened by the fact that, if the 
key used to encrypt the data is compromised, it will result in 
loss of data that is encrypted using the compromised key.  
ICmetrics (Integrated Circuit metrics) will generate an 
encryption key based on certain unique and measurable 
hardware and software properties of the sensor node, which 
will greatly improve security, thus providing resilience to 
node capture attacks. 
It makes use of hardware and software properties of the 
system thus providing resilience against tampering of 
hardware and software configuration. If tampering of these 
features takes place or if there is a change to the software 
executing on a particular hardware configuration, the 
generated private key forming as a result of recently 
generated ICmetrics will be different to the private key that 
was initially generated. This phenomenon in turn will 
prohibit the infected node from participating any further in 
the network operations, as will be evident from the node 
capture attack scenarios in the next section. 
VI. NODE CAPTURE ATTACK SCENARIOS 
In the following section we use two scenarios to further 
elaborate on the threat model of a node capture attack 
launched in WSNs. 
A. ICmetrics- Access to the Cryptographic Key 
In the first case of node capture attacks, once the 
adversary has gathered the required network information, 
the adversary’s goal is to physically capture the sensor node 
and extract its cryptographic key associated with the node, 
so that it can decrypt all the information destined to the 
sensor node, as shown in Fig. 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Threat model - key compromise 
B. ICmetrics-Manipulating the Hardware and Software 
Properties 
In the second scenario of node capture attacks, when the 
adversary is satisfied with the passive and active learning of 
information from the nodes/network, its goal is once again 
physically to capture the node and make changes to all the 
hardware and software configuration of the node. In this 
case of node capture attack, the attacker can make the sensor 
nodes work as and when needed rather than their normal 
operation. This process is further explained in Fig. 3 where 
the attacker’s attempt to make changes to the system 
properties is unsuccessful. 
ICmetrics has the ability to resist against this type of 
node capture attack, since any tampering with the hardware/ 
software properties of the sensor node will change its 
internal parameters, resulting in a different ICmetric being 
computed for the sensor node. This difference in the 
computed ICmetrics will cause an increase in the node’s 
intra sample variance, and a decrease in the sensor node’s 
inter-sample variance. This change will provide an 
indication that the sensor node has been tampered and the 
sensor node will not be able to take part in the network 
operation. 
Attacker monitors/ logs radio packets during 
network operation 
Attacker tries to capture 
the key associated with 
the victim node
Attacker unsuccessful in 
key compromise 
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Figure 3. Threat Model – Manipulating Properties 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Wireless Sensor Networks are highly susceptible to node 
capture attacks due to the broadcast nature of the 
communication channel. Node capture attacks are a severe 
threat to the security of WSNs, since their threat severity 
can range from the compromise of a single node to the 
whole network being overtaken by an adversary. We 
propose the use of ICmetrics to safeguard WSNs against 
node capture attacks.  
Very much like biometrics, the ICmetric technology 
computes the metrics based on the hardware/ software 
properties of the senor node, so it doesn’t require a stored 
private key for the operation to take place. The key is 
computed as and when needed, safeguarding the node from 
compromise of the cryptographic key. Secondly any change 
in hardware/ software properties of the node generates a 
different ICmetric associated with the node, thus stopping it 
to take further part in the network. Therefore using 
ICmetrics, resilience against node capture is strengthened 
and overall survivability of the network is also enhanced. 
VIII. FUTURE WORK 
Our future plan is to test our scheme through experiments 
and analysis, thus benchmarking the results against existing 
schemes that provide security against node capture attacks. 
We expect that our proposed solution will be an efficient 
solution providing resilience against node capture attacks. 
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